Using science and technology to understand and improve how we think.

An Argument against the reliability of intuition

I’d like to get some feedback on an argument. Here’s the rough outline of the premises.

Our intuitions and our ability or inability to imagine (i.e., “conceivability“) are contingent upon cognitive capacities.
Our cognitive capacities are contingent upon our material composition (e.g., the structure and function of our brains [Assumption].
Our intuitions and ability (or inability) to imagine is contingent upon our material composition [1,2 HS]. Continue reading An Argument against the reliability of intuition

Higher-order Thought v. Higher-order Cortex

During a morning session of the SPP, Benjamin Kozuch made the following argument involving higher order thought:

1. If Higher order theories of consciousness are true, then prefrontal lesions should produce manifest deficits in consciousness (as defined by HOT).
2. PF lesions do not produce manifest deficits in consciousness.
3. Therefore, many HO theories are not true.

Liad Murdik, in her comments, adeptly pointed out that the PFC is commonly taken to be a center (location, module, etc.) of HO states by a number of people, but this might be a mistake. She explains: it does not follow from the notion that the PFC is associated with higher order mental capacity (i.e. what makes humans more cognitively advanced than, say, mammals without a PFC) that the PFC is the location of HO thought or states. HO thoughts and states could very well be the product of dynamic relationships between various cortices.

Continue reading Higher-order Thought v. Higher-order Cortex

Philosophers’ Carnival #139

Greetings and welcome! This Philosopher’s Carnival comes from Boulder, CO. Posts are in the order in which they were submitted/found and summaries are beneath each post.
Continue reading Philosophers’ Carnival #139

Personal Identity: Taking Vantage Points More Seriously

Suppose the following about persons.

1. Persons have sensory experiences from certain vantage points
2. Persons’ have psychological states
3. Sensory experience and psychological states can vary as a function of vantage point

How does this effect personal identity? To put it briefly, it would mean that for one person to be identical with another, then (given Leibniz Law, strictly enforced) the persons would have to be identical according, at least, to the following variables:

1. Sensory experience and psychological state(s)
2. Vantage point(s)

Continue reading Personal Identity: Taking Vantage Points More Seriously