Last week I was talking about intuition. I think of intuition as — among other things — unconscious and automatic reasoning. The opposite of that would be conscious and deliberative reasoning. We might call that reflective reasoning.† In this post I want to talk about reflective reasoning. How does it work? And why does it work? And — spoiler alert — why does it sometimes not work?
1. An Example
Do some math for me, will you? Multiply 13 x 16. And try doing it in your head. Don’t use scrap paper or a calculator or anything like that.
Take all the time you need. I’ll be here.
Got it? Check your work with Google.
Question: what were you doing when you reasoned your way to the answer?
You were — among other things — reasoning reflectively. That is, you thought about some stuff — like ’16’ and ’13’ — but you also had some thoughts about thoughts about stuff — like “How might I multiply ’16’ by ’13’?”. These thoughts were both deliberate and conscious.
And that is a classic case of reflective reasoning: consciously and deliberately thinking about thought(s).
2. Reflective Reasoning Works
We can do great stuff with reflective reasoning. Thanks to reflective reasoning, we can retrace our mental steps, spot errors, and fix those errors. We can even construct a narrative of each step in this process.
And these tasks are pretty important — and not just for doing spontaneous multiplication tasks. These tasks help us plan for the future, learn from our past, and explain our reasoning (to ourselves and to others). So if reflective reasoning is responsible for carrying out these tasks, then it is a good thing …when it works, that is.
What about when it doesn’t work? How does that happen? And why does that happen? Why does reflective reasoning sometimes result patently false judgments (Bortolotti 2011, section 3)? And why does it sometimes increase polarization (Kahan et al 2013; Schkade, Sunstein, Hastie 2010)?
3. But How? And Why?
So while it’s obvious that reflective reasoning can work, it’s not obvious why it does.†† And it’s certainly not obvious why it sometimes doesn’t work.
A good account of reflective reasoning will make this more obvious. A good account will explain not only what reflective reasoning is, but how and why it works. And, importantly, a good account of reflective reasoning will explain how and why it sometimes doesn’t work.
In my dissertation, I hope to provide a good account of reflective reasoning: an account that explains the why and the how.
I’ll be blogging about my progress as I work on the dissertation. So subscribe to the blog or follow me on social media if you’re interested in learning more about the project. Or if you just want to see the final product, then follow me on Google Scholar where the finished dissertation will be posted.
Until Next Time
You can also find my MA thesis, “Intuitive and Reflective Responses in Philosophy” on Google Scholar (for free). Here are the main findings:
- Philosophers were more reflective than others.
- Less reflective philosophers were more likely to be theists, deontologists about the trolley problem, physicalists (as opposed to psychologists) about personal identity, fregeans about language, and scientific anti-realists (although that last one turned out to be a spurious correlation, as I mention in the thesis).
† This is more or less how the terms ‘intuitive’ and ‘reflective’ are used among many cognitive scientists and philosophers. For a discussion of that, see Byrd 2014, 7-13.
†† Thanks to my advisor, John Schwenkler, for drawing my attention to this.