A 2019 paper in the Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science found that most psychology textbooks, instructors, and students misinterpret ‘statistical significance’ and p-values. Talk about a headline! More important than the headline, however, are the right interpretations and what we can do to correct widespread misinterpretations. In this post, I explain the authors’ findings and the three solutions they propose.
Continue reading The meaning of ‘statistical significance’ and of p-valuesCategory: Philosophy of Science
Upon Reflection Podcast Ep. 1: What We Can Infer About Implicit Bias
Welcome to the first episode of Upon Reflection, a podcast about what we think as well as how and why we think it.

In this podcast, I’ll be reading my paper entitled, “What We Can (And Can’t) Infer About Implicit Bias From Debiasing Experiments“. I argue that implicit bias is not entirely unconscious or involuntary, but it probably is associative. As with all of my papers, the free preprint of the paper can be found on my CV at byrdnick.com/cv under “Publications“.
If this sounds like the kind of research that you want to hear more about, you can subscribe to Upon Reflection wherever you find podcasts. You can also find out more about me and my research on Twitter via @byrd_nick, or on Facebook via @byrdnick. If you end up enjoying the Upon Reflection podcast, then feel free to tell people about it, online, in person, or in your âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸ review.
Related posts
- Podcasts …for research?
- New paper: What We Can (And Can’t) Infer About Implicit Bias From Debiasing Experiments
- Upon Reflection Podcast, Ep. 0: Introduction
- 10+ Podcasts about Cognitive Science
- 40+ Podcasts about Philosophy
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 53:23 — 48.9MB)
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Introduction to Philosophy: A Free Course
Below are the syllabus and materials for my Introduction to Philosophy course. You are welcome to use any of the material as a student or as an instructor. The usual creative commons license applies to my portion of thisâi.e., only the stuff to which I would have a copyright. (If you are my student, remember that you can be quizzed on the contents of the syllabus.)
I. Introduction to Philosophy
Did you know that people who study philosophy make significantly fewer reasoning errors than others? (See Livengood et al 2010 and Byrd 2014). And did you know that philosophy majors outperform basically everyone else on the GRE? And did you know that the median mid-career salary for people who major in philosophy is $81,000? And did you know that philosophy majors were projected to be the top-paid humanities major in 2016? Find out more about philosophy majors here. And if youâve never taken a philosophy class, you might want to read this 3-4 page intro. Continue reading Introduction to Philosophy: A Free Course
New Paper: What We Can (And Can’t) Infer About Implicit Bias From Debiasing Experiments
Synthese has just published one of my papers on implicit bias. As with all of my papers, you can find a link to the free preprint on my CV: byrdnick.com/cv. The final, corrected, and typeset version is on Syntheseâs website and the audio version is on my podcast. In this post, you will find a non-technical overview of the paper’s main point and then the TLDR explainer.
A Dissertation About Reflective Reasoning in Philosophy, Morality, & Bias
One of the things that I worked on in 2018 was a dissertation about the roles of reflective reasoning in philosophy, morality, and bias. Pending a follow-up study for one chapter, every chapter is written and has enjoyed at least one round of commentsâand some of the chapters are under review. As the chapters find homes in journals, I will be sure to post preprints and links to the online publication on my blog and in my social media feeds. So, ya know, follow those if you want more updates. In this post, I’ll give you drafts of the abstracts for each chapter, so that you can get a birds-eye view of the dissertation project.â
[Update: audio and video of the introduction to the dissertation defense is now available.]
Continue reading A Dissertation About Reflective Reasoning in Philosophy, Morality, & Bias
50+ Philosophy Podcasts
Philosophy takes many forms. So do its podcasts. Here are some of the most popular philosophy podcasts that I have found. I listen to almost all of them, so feel free to contact me if you have questions that are not answered in each podcast’s description below.
3 Obstacles For Research About Cheating & Morality
What if traveling abroad were somehow bad for you? Well, a series of studies seem to find that “[traveling abroad] can lead to [lying and cheating] by increasing moral relativism” (Lu et al 2017, 1, 3). This finding has just the right combination of intuitive plausibility and surprise for us to want to share it uncritically. So, instead, let’s take a look at the methods, measures, and philosophical nuances of the topic. As usual, a bit of reflection makes the finding a bit less exciting and it reveals a need for follow-up research.
Continue reading 3 Obstacles For Research About Cheating & Morality
Science vs. Philosophy …or maybe they are continuous
My Facebook page says that I am a scientist, but I do science and philosophy. So am I a philosopher or a scientist? That question assumes that we can argue for a clear boundary between philosophy and scienceâan assumption that’s (at best) controversial, but more likely an “unqualified failure” (Laudan 1996, 85). Here are three reasons to think that philosophy is continuous with science. Continue reading Science vs. Philosophy …or maybe they are continuous
Domain-familiarity & The Cognitive Reflection Test
This week I’m commenting on Nicholas Shea and Chris Frith’s âDual-process theories and consciousness: the case for âType Zeroâ cognition” (2016) (open access) over at  the Brains blog. My abstract is below. Head over to Brains for the full comments and subsequent discussion.
Abstract
Type 1 and type 2 cognition are standard fare in psychology. Now Shea and Frith (2016) introduce type 0 cognition. This new category of cognition manifests from existing distinctions â (a) conscious vs. unconscious and (b) deliberate vs. automatic. Why do existing distinctions result in a new category? Because Shea and Frith (henceforth SF) apply each distinction to a different concept: one to representation and the other to processing. The result is a 2-by-2 taxonomy like the one below. This taxonomy classifies automatic processing over unconscious representations as type 0 cognition. And, deviating from convention, this taxonomy classified automatic processing over conscious representation(s) as type 1 cognition.
PROCESSING | |||
Automatic | Deliberate | ||
REPRESENTATION | Unconscious | Type 0 | ? |
Conscious | Type 1 | Type 2 |
According to SF, we deploy each type of cognition more or less successfully depending on our familiarity with the domain. When weâre familiar with the domain, we may not need to integrate information from other domains (via conscious representation) and/or deliberately attend to each step of our reasoning. So in a familiar domain, type 0 cognition might suffice.
SF briefly mention how this relates to the cognitive reflection test (CRT) (Frederick 2005). There is a puzzle about how to interpret CRT responses that do not fit a common dual-process interpretation of the CRT. In what follows, I will show how SFâs notion of domain-familiarity can make sense of these otherwise puzzling CRT responses.
Related Posts
- What Is Reflective Reasoning?
- Is Philosophical Reflection Ever Inappropriate?
- Is Reflective Reasoning Supposed To Change Your Mind?
- Why Critical Reasoning Might Not Require Self-knowledge
- Christine Korsgaard on Reflection and Reflective Endorsement
Image: “Wiffel ball” from Andrew Malone as modified by Nick Byrd. CC BY 2.0
Experimental Philosophy 2.0: The Neuroscience of Philosophy
If our judgments are dependent on the brain, then maybe we can understand our judgments by studying our brains. Further, maybe we can understand our philosophical judgments by studying our brains. What do you think? Can neuroscience help us understand philosophy? Here are some studies which suggest that it can.
1.  Two Opposing Neural Networks/Judgments
Consider two different networks in the brain: the Default Mode Network (DMN) and the Task Positive Network (TPN). These networks are mutually inhibitory. When one network’s activity increases, the other network’s activity decreases. It’s a bit like a seesaw (Jack et al 2013).
Continue reading Experimental Philosophy 2.0: The Neuroscience of Philosophy