I’m lucky to share updates about new jobs, new projects, and what’s happening next on the blog, the podcast, and the YouTube channel. I’ll explain below.
Continue reading New Jobs, New Projects, & What’s NextTag: Psychology
Anders Ericsson (1947-2020)
My colleagues and I are deeply saddened about the unexpected passing of Anders Ericsson on June 17. Dr. Ericsson was not only a massive figure in psychology, philosophy, performance, and beyond butâin my experienceâan outstanding person.
Standout Memories
There is much to say about Anders. I can speak only to the past few yearsâand only a slice of it. Nonetheless, that slice of Anders is rich. Indulge me in just three stories.
Continue reading Anders Ericsson (1947-2020)On Whether Reflection Is A Virtue
Some philosophers think of rationality in terms of virtue. For them, the rational thing to do is what the epistemically virtuous person would do. One type of reasoning that I study is reflective reasoning in which we step back and reconsider a gut reaction. So I have found myself asking, “Is reflective reasoning a virtue?” In this post, I’ll briefly consider reasons for answering “yes” and reasons for answering “no.” Continue reading On Whether Reflection Is A Virtue
Upon Reflection, Ep. 3: Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being
Welcome to the third episode of Upon Reflection, a podcast about what we think as well as how and why we think it.
In this podcast, I read my chapter, “Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being” from Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. In this chapter, I review how well-being and ill-being can be understood in terms of the causal networks studied by economists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and other scientists. As with all of my writing, the free preprint can be found on my CV at byrdnick.com/cv under “Publications“.
If you want to hear more, you can subscribe wherever you find podcasts. You can also find out more about me and my research on Twitter via @byrd_nick, or on Facebook via @byrdnick. If you end up enjoying the Upon Reflection podcast, then feel free to tell people about it, online, in person, or in your âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸ review.
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- Upon Reflection Podcast, Ep. 0: Introduction
- 15+ Podcasts about Cognitive Science
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- Experimental Philosophy 2.0: The Neuroscience of Philosophy
- Exercise, Neuroscience, and the Network Theory of Well-being
- New Paper â Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 40:21 — 73.9MB)
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New Paper â Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being
Philosophers are stereotyped as studying things like, “What is a good life?” To break this stereotype, I’ve spent some time studying a different question, “What is a bad life?” More seriously, I have applied causal network accounts of well-being to ill-being, particularly depression and digital ill-being. My latest paper on this has now been accepted for publication in The Ethics of Digital Well-being (2020). So now I can share it. You you check out the abstract and acknowledgments (below), listen to the free audiopaper, and/or read the free preprint.
Continue reading New Paper â Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-beingNew Talk: Great Minds Do Not Think Alike
Iâll be presenting new data from a pre-registered replication at some conferences in the next few months. The study replicated findings that those with a Ph.D. in philosophy are more reflective, that less reflective philosophers tended towards certain philosophical views, and that some of these reflection-philosophy correlations are partly confoudned with culture, education, gender, or personality.
March 2022 update: these data are in a paper that was accepted by Review of Philosophy & Psychology.
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Upon Reflection, Ep. 2: Not All Who Ponder Count Costs â Reflection & Moral Dilemmas
In this podcast episode , I’ll be reading Paul Conway’s and my recent paper about moral dilemmas entitled, “Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies“. In this paper we find thatâcontrary to some dual process theories’ claimsâconsequentialist responses to moral dilemmas may not be more reflective per se, but rather more influenced by mathematical information. As with all of my papers, the free preprint of the paper can be found on my CV at byrdnick.com/cv under “Publications“.
If this sounds like the kind of research that you want to hear more about, you can subscribe to Upon Reflection wherever you find podcasts. You can also find out more about me and my research on Twitter via @byrd_nick, or on Facebook via @byrdnick. If you end up enjoying the Upon Reflection podcast, then feel free to tell people about it, online, in person, or in your âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸âď¸ review.
Related
- Upon Reflection Podcast, Ep. 0: Introduction
- Upon Reflection Podcast, Ep. 1: What We Can Infer About Implicit Bias
- 10+ Podcasts about Cognitive Science
- 40+ Podcasts about Philosophy
- Is Reflective Reasoning Supposed To Change Your Mind?
- Christine Korsgaard on Reflection and Reflective Endorsement
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:19:35 — 72.9MB)
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New Paper: What We Can (And Can’t) Infer About Implicit Bias From Debiasing Experiments
Synthese has just published one of my papers on implicit bias. As with all of my papers, you can find a link to the free preprint on my CV: byrdnick.com/cv. The final, corrected, and typeset version is on Syntheseâs website and the audio version is on my podcast. In this post, you will find a non-technical overview of the paper’s main point and then the TLDR explainer.
On Inferring Mechanisms In Cognitive Science
One of the things that cognitive scientists do is look for, identify, and describe mechanisms. For example, cognitive scientists are interested in our ability (or proclivity) to ascribe mental states to others things and creatures. So, some posit a “theory of mind” mechanism. But, intuitively, there will not be a mechanism for every one of our abilities or behaviors. For example, it would be surprising if there were mechanism for driving a car. But if that is right, then we need principled reasons to think so. Or, at the very least, we need a story about why some of our abilities have mechanisms and others don’t. In this post, Iâll briefly consider four such stories. One of the take-aways will be that it is not obvious why some abilities (like driving a car) do not have mechanisms. Another take-away will be that it is not obvious what scientists mean by ‘mechanism’. Continue reading On Inferring Mechanisms In Cognitive Science
Philosophy As Proto-Psychology
Philosophers are often trying to understand their intuitions about thought experiments. Traditionally, philosophers do this via introspection. But these days, some philosophers do it more scientifically: they survey people’s’ intuitions and use quantitative arguments for theories about the intuitions. In this post, I want to point out that one of philosophers’ traditional methods might be a kind of proto-psychology. And if that is right, you might wonder, “Is one method better than the other?” By the end of the post, you’ll know of at least one philosopher who argues that the more scientific approach is better. Continue reading Philosophy As Proto-Psychology